Civil Society Organizations Divided Over Proposed DRC–USA Minerals-for-Security Deal
In the context of renewed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the March 23 Movement (M23) continues to advance, the Congolese government has approached the United States with a proposal to exchange access to critical minerals for military assistance. President Trump’s administration has signaled openness to such a partnership and dispatched a special envoy to Kinshasa for initial talks.
(Source: Presidency of the DRC)
This proposal has stirred mixed reactions among Congolese civil society organizations (CSOs). For many, the move revives memories of the 2007 mineral-for-infrastructure agreement with Chinese companies—commonly referred to as the “Chinese contracts”—which collapsed under the weight of mismanagement, lack of transparency, and entrenched corruption. Even the more recent renegotiation of those contracts under President Félix Tshisekedi is widely regarded as unsatisfactory, plagued by similar structural issues.
Given these precedents, skepticism runs deep. Several CSOs argue that the country’s current political and institutional instability—exacerbated by ongoing conflict and foreign military presence in parts of the east—makes it ill-prepared to enter into such a high-stakes deal. They call for a postponement of negotiations and urge the government to first focus on rebuilding a credible national defense system using domestic resources.
Others, however, support moving forward with the proposal, but only under strict conditions. This group insists that both the Congolese and American governments must commit to full transparency and ensure that any resulting agreement reflects fairness, equity, and accountability in the management of the country’s mineral wealth.
Despite this divide, the prevailing view among CSOs leans toward caution. The unpredictability of U.S. political leadership and the absence of strong governance guarantees are seen as major risks, raising fears that the DRC could once again enter a resource deal that benefits external actors more than the Congolese people.
As part of this ongoing debate, a recent policy brief by Southern Africa Resource Watch Executive Director, Claude Kabemba provides further insight into the risks and limitations of the proposed partnership. Kabemba outlines the DRC’s limited control over its most strategic minerals—many of which are already operated by foreign entities or located in unstable regions. He also questions the long-term viability of the deal given the Congolese government’s current capacity constraints and political uncertainty.
“Time could be Tshisekedi’s biggest enemy. President Trump is in business. He will choose the side that offers the best options for sustainable and long-term access to critical minerals and rare earth elements,” Kabemba writes.
His analysis adds weight to the concerns raised by a majority of CSOs: that without structural reform and stronger institutional safeguards, the DRC risks repeating past mistakes—this time with even higher geopolitical stakes.