

# EUROPEAN UNION FISHERIES

# AGREEMENTS: THE CASE OF ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE





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## **Abstract**

Most Southern African countries which are not only small, weak, vulnerable and inward looking, but also least developed, highly indebted poor countries, land locked and small islands, have negotiated Fisheries Agreements (FAs) with the European Union (EU). In the case of Angola and Mozambique, which are well endowed with fisheries resources, a number of FAs have been governing the exploitation of the fisheries resources. There are strong possibilities that both countries will continue to renegotiate these FAs, which are currently outside the framework of the ongoing economic partnership agreements (EPAs) meant to replace current preferential arrangements associated with the everything-but-arms (EBA) initiative of the Lomé Conventions. In this respect, the paper seeks to (i) dispel the notion that the FAs outcomes alleviate poverty while stimulating industrial development in both countries' fisheries sector; (ii) review existing bilateral trade agreements on fisheries between the EU and Angola and Mozambique; (iii) examine challenges arising from the implementation of FAs in the light of existing socio-economic conditions in those countries; and (iv) assess possibilities of using financial compensation to redress existing supply-side constraints which restrict production and export potential in both countries.

## **Acronyms**

EC	European Commission
EPAs	Economic Partnership Agreements
EU	European Union
FAs	Fisheries Agreements
IMO	International Marine Organisation
IOC	Indian Ocean Community
IPAFAs	Institute for Development of Artisanal Fishing and Aquaculture
IUU	Illegal, unregulated and unreported
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MCS	Monitoring, Control and Surveillance
SADC	Southern African Development Community
EBA	Everything-but-arms
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
FAO	Food Agricultural Organisation

## **INTRODUCTION**

The European Union (EU) has negotiated Fisheries Agreements (FAs) with a number of coastal and port-states in Southern Africa. These countries include Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Namibia and the Indian Ocean Countries<sup>1</sup> (IOC). However, the focus of this paper is on the FAs negotiated and signed by Angola and Mozambique at different phases and periods. The FAs run for a given period, with provision for renewal and/or renegotiation. Both Angola and Mozambique only benefit from direct annual financial flows, which, in the case of Mozambique, is termed “compensation” in return for allowing EU vessels to catch fisheries resources in the territorial waters of the respective countries. The FAs provide for fishing licences that stipulate specific quotas each ship-owner should catch in the respective countries’ waters. Although monitoring systems have been incorporated into the agreements, in practise they fall short of ensuring unbiased implementation of the FAs. In this connection, the monitoring systems were/are being compromised by the prevalence of illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing activities in the waters of both countries. As with any trade and cooperation agreement, the implementation of FAs produces ‘unintended challenges’, which explicitly expose limitations in the structural and institutional capacity of both countries. These include poor relationships between the negotiators and other strategic constituencies; weak monitoring capacity of legal provisions in these agreements; and the inability to avoid renegotiating previously agreed provisions, positions and offers at global platforms. As a result, the EU fleets benefit by exploiting weak monitoring capacities in these economies.

Although the fisheries sector has huge potential, available statistics suggest otherwise. In both countries, the contribution of this sector to the overall economic growth, employment creation, foreign currency and linkages with the rest of the economy is marginal. As least developed countries (LDCs), both countries have

extremely high poverty levels and unimpressive socio-economic conditions such as social services provisioning (healthcare facilities, education and sanitation) and infra-structural developments (roads, railways, bridges and public utilities such as water and electricity). The FAs outcomes are yet to stimulate the growth and development of this sector and the economy. The above is increased by the presence of considerable supply-side constraints that discourage the performance of this sector and the economy. As a result, the FAs risk perpetuating the unhealthy post-colonial dependence on Europe for developmental aid and fiscal support but fail to minimise the extensive exploitation of fisheries resources.

Apart from the introduction, the rest of this paper is divided as follows: section two briefly outlines the theoretical bases that contextualise the background to the FAs in the respective countries; sections three and four briefly describe and identify the principal points of contention in the Angola-EU and Mozambique-EU FAs, respectively; section five explores challenges and conditions that seem to promote the plunder of the fisheries resources in both countries' waters. Lastly, the paper concludes by highlighting challenges that policy instruments should address as well as recommending policies required to support the growth and development of this sector.



## **BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The FAs negotiated between the EU and a number of coastal and port-states in Southern Africa such as Angola and Mozambique can be premised within the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage, which suggests that in the absence of trade restrictions, each nation will specialise in goods and services that it can produce relatively more efficiently than other nations. The international specialisation increases the efficiency of global production and results in increased trade and greater aggregate welfare to the citizens. According to this theory, global welfare is maximised through open markets, which accurately price goods and services, thereby enabling producers in each country to discover what they are comparatively good at producing. The theory also maintains that the differences in production costs among countries are at the heart of international trade. Thus, production in the fisheries sector lies with the ability to harvest fisheries resources in Angolan and Mozambican waters. In the same vein, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, which highlights the importance of relative factor abundance, argues that as long as countries are differently endowed with different quantities of factors, trade will take place between them, and such trade will be beneficial to all involved.

Indeed, trade theories fit very well into the relationship between Europe and the coastal and port-countries of Angola and Mozambique which are well endowed with marine resources. The countries have an impressive coastal and exclusive economic zone measuring about 1,600 and 2,780 kilometres, respectively. Both countries have inland water resources that are home to a diverse range of aquatic fauna and flora, shellfish and a variety of other fish species. In the case of Mozambique, inland water bodies include Cabora Bassa and Lake Nyassa which is shared with Malawi, and Angola's water bodies include rivers such as the Congo, Cuando, Cuanza, Kasai, Kwango, Luena, Lungwebungu and Zambezi. Fish catches from both countries are categorised into a variety of crustaceans, marine fish, molluscs and freshwater fish

as shown in Box I below. The box shows that some species are more exploited than others. The exploitation of both marine and inland fisheries resources differs from country to country and by fish species as determined by internal and/or external factors including the dictates of market trends and the objectives of fisher-folk, climatic conditions and the availability of fisheries resources.

<b>Box I:</b>	<b>Categories of fish catches in Angola and Mozambique</b>
Crustaceans:	such as shrimps, lobster, deepwater crayfish and crabs. This group is the most sought after, thus generating conditions for high exploitation;
Marine fish:	such as large demersals, large pelagics, sharks and deepwater fish. This group is moderately exploited;
Molluscs:	such as sea cucumbers and octopus. In this category, sea cucumbers are highly exploited compared to the rest of this class; and
Freshwater fish:	such as kapenta and demersal fish. In this category, kapenta is highly exploited and also sustains many diets not only in the respective countries, but also in neighbouring countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The fisheries sector in both countries contributes insignificantly to national economic growth and development. The sector, which in the case of Angola is the third most important, remains largely unimpressive in terms of its contribution to job creation, foreign currency earnings and the gross domestic product (GDP). In both countries, the fisheries sector is being overshadowed by other sectors. In Angola, the sector only exports 5% of the total fish landings of which Europe enjoys high quality frozen fish, lobsters and prawns. This suggests that any future increase in export to the fisheries products may not necessarily be attributable to higher production, but rather a redirection of trade from other markets; that Angola depends less on the EU market; and that the fisheries sector supports the livelihoods of fisher-folk who are mainly involved in artisanal fishing. Available data suggest that 90% of the total fish catches are destined for local consumption and other industrial processes. In this way, one would assume that the rest of the fish catch is destined for the local market thereby contributing to food security and nutrition but the prevalence of poverty and paucity of data on fisheries suggest significant leakage within the production-marketing value chain, that is, harvesting fisheries in the territorial waters and mar-

keting within the countries and beyond. This shows that all the fisheries harvests are not coordinated or are done by unregistered production and marketing units in Angola. The question is: who is buying this fish? What is known, however, is that the majority of the population have no purchasing power to significantly partake in the domestic fisheries markets?

The above defies the logic of having a series of FAs,<sup>2</sup> which by now should have modernised fisheries harvesting through investing in technology and training of the fisher-folk. Indeed, most local fisher-folk have failed to graduate from the lowest fishing production method (artisanal) to higher levels of fishing production such as semi-industrial and industrial production methods (see below). Similarly, in Mozambique, the sector in 2003 contributed 4 and 28% to the country's GDP and foreign currency earnings, respectively. Like in Angola, the sector has remained largely artisanal and dominated by small-scale operators, who in turn, employ about 100,000 people in either production or marketing activities. The SADC Report (2005) notes that the fishing fleet is limited in these countries though there are a number of direct licensing schemes and joint ventures with the Japanese, Spanish, South Africans and Portuguese. These companies mainly harvest prawns and shrimp and the fish are exported without any value addition, that is, without being subjected to industrial processes. The FAs are silent on supporting any prospects for industrialisation in this sector, a development that suggests continued exporting of raw fisheries resources to the EU and other global markets. Thus, the FAs seem to entrench the historical legacy of exporting only raw materials in the form of fisheries resources. There has been no major discussion on how to process the harvested fisheries resources within the confines of these economies, a development that is necessary in terms of creating jobs, generating significant levels of foreign currency and contributing significantly towards the overall economic growth and development. Indeed, in both countries, there has been no major debate on actionable strategic plans or activities aimed at introducing industrialisation processes of this resource. Without industrialisation, no significant forward and backward linkage can be traced between this sector and the rest of the economy.

The above shows that the fishing industry in both countries has not fully realised the enormous potential that it has in both economies. The mere fact that an industrialised group of countries agrees to a framework of exploiting the sectoral resources

means that the sector has potential to transform the respective socio-economic conditions of the respective economies. While the framework and provisions are known, there are a number of challenges that hinder growth and development of this sector, which the FAs are failing to resolve. The SADC Report (2005) identifies the above challenges as the lack of monitoring the implementation of the FAs; limited capacity to assess fisheries resources; over-exploitation of certain commercial species; poor technology for fish handling and processing; low investment in aquaculture; IUU fishing activities; and poor marketing, distribution and storage infrastructure.

Both countries practise three main types of fishing harvesting or production, which are summarised below as artisanal fishing, semi-industrial fishing and large-scale industrial fishing.

*Artisanal fisheries:* This is carried out by using very basic equipment such as dugout canoes operated by oars. In this respect, Angola has an estimated 25,000 fisher-folk population using over 4,500 boats exploiting the fisheries resources. In Mozambique, an estimated 3% of artisanal fishermen have boats that are equipped with engines, of which almost half are operated by foot using small seine nets. The bulk of the fish catches are usually for domestic consumption due to limited market access by this category of fisher-folk. Munyuki (2006) argues that artisanal fishing activity is the lifeline of thousands of Mozambican communities, most of which reside in the poorest provinces of Zambezia and Nampula, which incidentally are the most populated with 40% of the country's total population. This fishing practice is beset with persistent problems including lack of modern equipment, unavailability of credit lines and poor infrastructure such as inaccessible roads. In Angola, many of the artisanal fishers are no longer organised due to the collapse of cooperatives. As a result, the sector no longer keeps accurate records of the quantity, quality and value of fisheries catches that pass through its system; as well as organised procurement of inputs such as boats, nets or sails. The key features of this industrial fishing activity are summarised in Box II below.

*Semi-industrial fisheries:* Figures from the year 2000 show that a total of 62 semi-industrial fishing companies operated, mostly in Maputo and Beira in Mozambique compared to 200 vessels in Angola. They possess better marine vessels and operate

**Box II:**

**Key features of artisanal fishing sub-sector**

- They are small open boats with or without out-board engine operated on a daily basis;
- Diverse but simple and reliable fishing technologies with the capacity to access and exploit efficiently almost all the fish resources of the continental shelf with no or only reduced negative impact on the environment;
- No mechanised equipment for fishing or navigation;
- Low capital intensity per unit of landed fish;
- Limited resources to invest in materials, inputs and working capital;
- Lack of information or records limit proper planning and management while that of infrastructure hamper marketing of fish and fish products.

trawlers, line vessels and kapenta platforms. The semi-industrial fleet has increased over the years, resulting in some imbalance between quotas (as agreed in the FAs) and actual catch in the shrimp fisheries. Thus, in the absence of data and proper records, this development creates conditions for over-exploiting the fisheries resources.

*Industrial fisheries:* This is the most sophisticated subsector, and is based around the ports, which can offer complex services such as cold storage facilities. Nearly 50% of the industrial fleet is foreign owned and most of the catch from these vessels is processed and packaged on board for export to overseas markets. The industrial fleets concentrate on highly commercial species such as shrimp and tuna. These large-scale fishing activities are dominated by equally large-scale industrial foreign fleets from countries such as the EU, Russia, Ukraine, Japan and Lithuania. The main catches include sardinellas, horse mackerel, sardines, dentex, shrimps, crabs, lobster, and other tropical bottom species. In 2000, for instance, the shrimp exports in Angola accounted for about US\$81 million. In 2005, Mozambique's fishing sector generated about €75 million worth of goods, of which shrimps accounted for 84% of the total export.

## ANGOLA – EU FISHERIES AGREEMENT

The first FA<sup>3</sup> between the EU and Angola was signed in 1987, and renewed every two years to provide the framework of exploiting the fisheries resource to the best mutual benefit of both parties. The negotiated framework assumed mutual benefit which creates both the necessary and sufficient conditions for sustainable growth and development of this sector in line with the respective national developmental agenda. The agreement allows EU vessel owners to catch fisheries such as shrimp, tuna and demersal from the Angolan waters in exchange for annual and/or per vessel financial compensation. For instance, the main attraction to Angola was the “dangling of developmental financial envelope” or “financial reward” as summarised in

<b>Table I:</b>		<b>Angola – EU Fisheries Agreements Compensation Levels, 2002 - 2004</b>	
	<b>2000/2002</b>	<b>2002/2004</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Annual cost for EU:	€13,975,000	€15,500,000	Paid by taxpayers
Specific measures	29% (€4 million)	35% (€5.5 million)	
Costs for ship-owners:			
Shrimp vessels	€58/GRT/month	€52/GRT/month	Full use for 4 months implies an average of €62,000/vessel.
Demersal vessels	€205/year/GRT	€220/year/GRT	Full use for 6 months implies €462,000 for all vessels.
Tuna per tonne caught	€25	€25	

Source: Lankester, 2002

the table for the period 2002 to 2004, which was/is meant to support the provisions of the agreement. Table I shows annual and specific EU disbursements, some of which originate from the EU ship-owners.

The agreement states that a joint-decision of the two parties may impose all the limits of specified catches in line with sustainable fisheries. However, the catch ceiling of 5,000 tonnes for shrimp vessels tends to benefit the ship-owners, who in some instances, shy away from their pledge to improve this industry. According to the agreement, the fishing licenses allow the ship-owners to catch agreed quantities of fisheries resources which should reflect the value and level of compensation accruing to Angola. The specific provisions of this trade regime are summarised in Box III below. For instance, while all the licences for EU vessels were used for shrimp and tuna fishing, vessels for demersal species utilised just 72% of all the licenses. This creates growing perception and concern, which link the failure to fully utilise the agreed license provisions with the equally increasing IUU activities in Angolan waters. This means that the EU fisheries not only violate the terms of the agreement, but also create conditions for over-exploiting the fisheries resources with impunity. But the failure by the EU fishing vessels to utilise all the negotiated licenses in the previous agreements is not only worrisome, but also creates suspicion which undermines the “mutual benefit” assumption. Parties hoped that all the licenses negotiated would be used this time. This calls for strict monitoring of legal instruments, which should in particular increase satellite-monitoring programmes on EU-vessels and prohibit all types of fishing vessels within 12 nautical miles of the coastal zone.

In order to prevent fast depletion of shrimp species, the agreement stipulated the biological rest period before catches would be allowed. In this respect, the agreement

**Box III: Specific arrangements in the Angola – EU fisheries agreement**

- A programme of satellite monitoring for all EU-vessels to continue;
- No fishing within the 12 nautical miles coastal zone;
- Biological rest period for shrimp may be put in place in the light of current scientific surveys;
- The support measures for the fishing sector such as quality control programme (to allow higher export values), improve scientific knowledge of the fisheries resources, surveillance programmes, non-industrial fisheries, institutional support and fisheries education.

stipulated the minimum mesh size for shrimp and demersal fishing at 50 mm and 110 mm, respectively. Although, both parties agreed to quality control checks to ensure higher export values, better scientific knowledge of the fisheries resources, surveillance programmes and institutional support, in practice this is not enough to prevent IUU activities, as well as to significantly support the development of this sector, which has the potential to improve the livelihood of the population.

Sustainable fisheries management requires a long-term management regime with clear objectives and instruments to achieve these goals. But Angola's institutional infrastructure is largely underdeveloped to manage, monitor and provide adequate surveillance mechanisms. This provides perfect conditions for the EU fishing vessels to easily exploit fisheries resources. Unlike Namibia and South Africa which have several fisheries management regimes in place for some species such as hake, Angola lacks reliable reference points for fish stocks in its waters that are subject to fishing under this agreement. Therefore, the agreement does not have maximum allowable catches based on scientific advice on fishing pressure since all limits for fishing opportunities may be increased when the ship-owners contribute to the improvement of Angola's fishing industry. However, to develop non-industrial fishing and fishing communities, the agreement provided over €1 million in support of that programme. But the biggest potential threat for the small fisher-folk in Angola is that of EU trawlers, particularly from Spain, which not only target shrimp and demersal species, but also fail to respect the stipulated coastal zone. There is therefore the danger that these trawlers may run over the local traditional small boats as well as displace them from their fishing zones. Presently, there is no structure for developing the fish industry that is capable of facilitating socio-economic growth and development in the medium- to long-term. The economy is only benefiting from the financial flows, which end up being allocated to other sectors of the economy or fuelling rent seeking behaviour instead of developing this sector and/or meeting the socio-economic needs of the communities. Kessler (2002) notes that the flow of oil revenues (and in this case fisheries revenues) contributes to widespread corruption in which approximately US\$1 billion per year or 15% of Angola's GDP is unaccounted for. The amount provided for in this agreement is also inadequate for meaningful sectoral growth and development.

Given the above challenges, the current negotiations on the renewed fisheries agreement protocol seeks to ensure that the new framework is in line with the new fish-



eries law which defines the general regulations pertaining to fishing, control and access rights. The law also stipulates that the right to fishery access must be transferred to Angolans and national companies and that the government can sign accords or enter into contract with foreigners as long as there is evidence of a surplus of fishery resources.

## **Opportunities in the sector**

Europe is the principal market for Angolan prawns and demersal fish. Table II below shows that Angolan fish exports to the EU were valued at €16 million, a big increase from the previous years). The share of fisheries as a percentage of total Angolan exports to the EU grew from 0.1% in 2004 to 0.6% the following year. This trend suggests an upward demand for Angolan fish, making the product a clear candidate for an offensive product to the EU market, a development that the negotiators should bear in mind when renegotiating the future FA. Thus, a combination of actual export fisheries receipts and financial compensation makes the fisheries sector an important export sector in terms of its contribution to foreign currency.

**Table II:** **Angolan fish exports to the EU  
(Chapter HS03 and HS1604), 2000 - 2005**

Year	Value (€' 000)	% total exports to EU	Volume, KG
2000	37,077	n/a	9,133
2001	41,389	n/a	10,268
2002	39,235	n/a	9,213
2003	2,041	n/a	623
2004	1,209	0.1%	498
2005	16,087	0.6%	1,026

Source: derived from Mero and Tekere, 2006

The desire therefore to develop the sector has seen authorities prioritising rehabilitation and modernisation of the sector. To this effect, the government through support from donors, which is being complimented by local efforts and resources, is facilitating the rebuilding of the fishing fleet. In addition, some donors are assisting in the construction of refrigeration facilities at the southern ports of Tombwe, overhauling in Namibe, and installation of new production lines at Tombwe. In this context, the EU is one of

the main donors directly financing a significant portion of some of the above projects and providing trade-related technical assistance in the country covering a wide range of mandates including activities of government negotiators and non-state actors<sup>4</sup> involved in trade talks. These are shown in Table III below.

**Table III: EU trade-related assistance programmes benefiting Angola**

<b>Project title</b>	<b>Project Description</b>	<b>Budget</b>	<b>Period</b>
Train for Trade	Capacity-building and technical assistance in international trade	€3 M	April 2006 – December 2013
Technical Cooperation Facility	A preparatory facility to identify and prepare implementation of actions under the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP)	€3.6 M	
Trade policy general	Capacity-building on trade policy issues	€3.6 M	April 2006 – December 2011

Source: compiled from: [www.sadc.int/english/tifi/trade/documents/inventory/TRAsector-table1Aug06.pdf](http://www.sadc.int/english/tifi/trade/documents/inventory/TRAsector-table1Aug06.pdf).

At the regional level, the EU support is targeted at regional programmes and/or projects designed to facilitate trade between individual SADC member states and the EU. In this respect, Angola has used this financial aid to improve domestic business legislation and regulatory frameworks, reduce non-tariff-barriers, and implement capacity-building training courses. Table IV shows that in 2006, regional coastal countries were given about €5.74 million to develop the capacity for monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing activities and other regional trade facilitation-related activities. The above points to potential cooperation areas, which current trade talks such as the EPAs process should prioritise, if Angola is to maximise future export production of fisheries resources.

In support of the above, the government remains committed to pursuing neo-liberal policy frameworks of trade liberalisation and market integration of the fisheries industry. Its efforts have been bolstered by the involvement of the World Bank which has worked closely with the local authorities to establish a fund to finance fisheries growth and development. The government has also enacted legislation that paved the way for the creation of the Institute for Development of Artisanal Fishing

**Table IV:****EU trade related assistance to the SADC  
– EPA group of countries**

<b>Project title</b>	<b>Project Description</b>	<b>Budget</b>	<b>Period</b>
Foot and Mouth Disease Project	To facilitate a review by member states of their legislation and regulations on livestock traceability, veterinary drugs and registration procedures as they affect trade in livestock and/or livestock products	€12.6 M	2006 – 2011
Standards, Quality Assurance, Accreditation and Metrology (SQAM)	To develop and implement a regional technical regulations policy and establish more effective, efficient and functioning trade-related SQAM support infrastructure.	€14.2 M	2006-2011
Regional Integration & the Multilateral Trading System	To strengthen institutional and human capacity of SADC member states and the SADC Secretariat in the relevant areas.	€1.09 M	February 2005 – December 2006
Regional Monitoring, Control & Surveillance of Fishing Activities	To develop national capacities for monitoring, control and surveillance in 5 SADC coastal <sup>5</sup> countries.	€5.74 M	– end 2006
Customs Modernisation & Trade Facilitation Programme	To support regional integration and harmonisation of customs legislation and procedures plus improved transit flows.	€18 M	2006-2010
Promotion of Regional Integration in the Livestock Sector	To increase productivity and trade flows in the traditional livestock sector.	€7.9 M	2004 – 2009
Technical cooperation facility	To support RIP including issues of development and trade through financing short training courses and participation in conferences.	€0.36 M	2005 – 2008
Regional Integration and Capacity Building Programme (RICBP)	To provide long and short-term expertise, training, operational costs, administrative support and limited equipment.	€15.6 M	– June 2007
Capacity Building for Regional Integration	This is phase II of RICBP above.	€10 M	2007 – 2010

and Aquaculture (IPAFA). This body's objectives include promoting and developing artisanal, marine and continental fishing, and promoting campaigns aimed at creating and developing artisanal fishing communities, estimated to directly benefit over 700 fishermen living along the Zaire River banks. IPAFA has so far distributed boats and canoes in addition to providing training to the fisher-folk. Parliament has complemented the above by ratifying several international accords aimed at setting up mechanisms for the management and operation of fishing.

### **Challenges facing the sector**

Despite the above commitment to revive the sector, with the support of both external funders and local investors, the sectors' challenges persist. This relates to the capacity utilisation of existing factories that process fish and fish products and the limited national purchasing power. The main markets where factories are relatively operational are the towns of Luanda and Candida. Factories of places such as Namibe and Lobito are not fully operational largely due to limited and irregular supplies of fish while an estimated 10 to 15 factories have ceased operating (Lankester, 2002). The failure to develop the fisheries sector, the third most important in the country, prevents the country from effectively generating resources required to improve the socio-economic conditions including poverty alleviation. Fisheries, as the third important sector, can be the vehicle for facilitating socio-economic development. Thus, for this to happen, fisheries agreements and/or any other bilateral and multilateral trade and cooperation arrangements should aim to significantly facilitate poverty alleviation and socio-economic development. Currently, the sector is dominated by artisanal fishing activities while prospects for further development are restricted by limited foreign investment. This requires government's commitment to drive the development of this sector in addition to ensuring transparency given its record of corruption in economic governance (see section 3.0)

Undesirable consequences of fisheries agreements have led to some EU fishing fleets being linked to IUU activities and at the same time some laws are failing to protect national players in the sector. For example, the new law in Angola restricts the allocation of fishery access rights to Angolan controlled companies thereby contradicting policies that seek to ensure that any fishery resources exploitation benefits local economic agents through job creation, incomes and entrepreneurial growth and development.

## **MOZAMBIQUE – EU FISHERIES AGREEMENT**

In 2002, the government of Mozambique and the European Commission (EC) signed the FA, which came into force in 2004, and is subject to a three-year renewal periods unless notice of termination is given in writing by either party at least six months prior to the expiry date of the initial period for each additional period (Munyuki, 2006). The FA has 15 short articles and a Protocol with provisions giving effect to the main agreement, which stipulate the conditions governing access of EU fishing vessels to Mozambican waters. In this respect, the agreement allows a total of 59 EU vessels to harvest fish in Mozambican waters. But no Mozambican fishing vessel is given access to EU waters. This shows that the agreement is a one-way access fisheries deal, in which Mozambique authorises EU vessels to fish its waters using a specific number of vessels as well as catch specific types, sizes and quantities of fisheries resources. For instance, every year a maximum of 10 EU fishing “opportunities” vessels target deep-water shrimp of up to 1,000 tonnes, and other catches estimated at over 530 tonnes, and broken down as 100 tonnes of Dublin bay prawn, 240 tonnes fish and 120 tonnes of crabs. The agreement also allows 35 other vessels to catch freezer tuna seiners and surface longliners, respectively.

The agreement promised to develop Mozambique’s economic, financial, technical and scientific cooperation in the fisheries sector, with a view to enhance not only conservation systems and techniques, but also sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources. Thus, the FA prioritises developmental support. Indeed, such support is necessary in order to improve fisheries infrastructure and other operational deficiencies, which currently inhibit the growth and development of the sector. In addition, the EU undertook during the negotiations “to ensure that all its vessels comply with the agreement and the relevant Mozambican laws and regulations” governing the fisheries sector.

In return, article 5 of the agreement commits the EU to grant “financial compensation” to Mozambique, fixed annually at €4.09 million for fishing “opportunities”, specified for the 59 vessels; €600,000 for tuna fishing estimated at about 8,000 tonnes; and €3.49 million for deep water shrimp. According to the agreement, this “compensation” seeks to support Mozambique’s programmes and any measure associated with the management and administration of fishing as well as conservation, development and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources. However, article 6 provides for the suspension of the above compensation by the EU if “serious events other than natural phenomena prevent fishing activities from being carried in the Mozambique’s fishing zone.” But the validity of the licences granted to EU vessels shall be extended by a period equal to that during which fishing activities were suspended. Munyuki (2006) argues that article 8 of the agreement pre-empts any possibility by Mozambique authorities to enforce certain conservation measures that may affect Europe’s fishing activities. This means that Mozambique cannot discriminate against EU vessels when adopting such objective and scientific criteria.

### **Is this the development promise?**

Although, the agreement promises certain developmental benefits to Mozambique, in reality it seems to facilitate the giving away of fisheries resources for three years in return for “compensation”, which is the currency upon which the development promises of the agreement are to be effected. It seems that the compensation is a contract price, and that Mozambique is not likely to sell its fisheries to the EU. The tone of the agreement language does give the impression of obliging the EU to pay for three years of fisheries harvests (Munyuki, 2006). It seems also that the “€4.09 million compensation’s provision” should support specific budgetary line items as shown in Table V below. From the table, there are no resources left for the country to improve the socio-economic conditions of the citizens, physical infrastructure to facilitate the flow of trade between the two regions and industrialisation efforts in the sector. Given the level of market competitiveness of Mozambique’s fish and fish products, the authorities should have prioritised modernising the fisheries processes, which in turn generates more revenue in addition to creating jobs and alleviating poverty for the country. A significant amount of the compensation money goes to monitoring fishing activities, research and training, which in essence, benefit EU institutions and structures which have more requisite skills and capacities to do so than their Mozambican counterparts. It is interesting to note that despite the alloca-

**Table V: EU's disbursements in Mozambique**

<b>Budgetary line item</b>	<b>Amount</b>
Monitoring marine fisheries	€1.5 million
Institutional development	€1 million
Research	€1 million
Training	€430 000
Quality control	€100,000
Participation in Joint Committee and other international meetings	€60.000

Source: Munyuki, 2006

tion to institutional development, no robust outcome has arisen which should benefit the country to date.

In order to check utilisation, article 4 of the Protocol requires the Mozambican authorities to report to the EU on how the above compensation budget has been used. This is another form of conditionality that facilitates the EU vessels to exploit resources with impunity. Moreover, the “compensation” is fixed, hence it makes no provision for adjustment in line with inflationary pressures as well as considering market values of the species.

The “compensation” provisions severely limit the ability of the Mozambican authorities to prioritise socio-economic spending of the proceeds of the fisheries agreement. There are no policies choices open to the Mozambican authorities. So they cannot, for example, use part of this “compensation” to invest in infrastructural development (construction roads, bridges, schools and healthcare facilities), poverty alleviation strategies and policy development initiatives with the view to benefit specifically many fishing communities. Mozambique, like any LDCs is home to supply-side constraints as illustrated in Box IV below. In addition, the value of conservation measures is also subject to nullification by the six-months long notice period required before Mozambican authorities can terminate the agreement.

In certain circumstances, it makes sense for authorities to limit the exploitation of certain resources to their citizens. This is in many cases considered as positive dis-

**Box IV:**

**Supply side constraints in Mozambique**

Mozambique has huge physical, human and institutional barriers that limit her production potential and market competitiveness. These include erratic, expensive and inefficient systems of economic and physical infrastructure, which damage the country's ability to produce with as much speed, variety and cost-efficiency as the EU. The country has weak supply capacities, which inhibit her potential to exploit the benefits from the current EU trade preferences. Major supply-side bottlenecks include unreliable public utilities (electricity and water); poor public infrastructure (run down roads, bridges and railways); weak institutional policy frameworks (fluctuating exchange rates, high inflation rates and poor fiscal measures); low labour productivity (arising from deficient education, poor health and inadequate housing); and unattractive investment climate.

crimination. Some conservation measures reserve certain resources extraction for the nationals. In the case of Mozambique, the use of such measures to promote the fortunes of the artisanal fishermen may look sensible, but the policy option is limited as there is a growing fear that the EU may view this as discrimination against its vessels. Given the economic power and the global influence of the EU, the consequences are harsh for a poor and vulnerable country like Mozambique.

The setting up of joint ventures (article 10) may have the effect of aiding technology transfer from the EU to Mozambican vessels. However, the concern is that the heavily subsidised EU fleet may end up taking over an investment portfolio of small local fleet under the guise of joint enterprise. In addition, there is the danger of creating monopolies, which has the potential to drive out small-scale sectors. Despite the agreement's call for the EU fleet to employ Mozambicans in numbers equal half their crew, it is unlikely, since the EU actors may site difficulties in identifying qualified and experienced people suitable for the job. In addition, the provision targets the lower job rank of non-officers.

From the above, it is clear that this agreement does not benefit the Mozambican economy, but rather simply creates opportunities for the EU fisheries industry. There is no really discernible benefit to the country in general and people living along the coastal areas who are directly affected by the EU fishing expeditions. The agreement fails to explicitly articulate how the artisanal and semi-industrial local fishermen are



to benefit from the given compensation. It is not pro-development in line with the national fisheries plans, visions and goals. It is unlikely to stimulate fisheries sector development in particular and overall economic growth and development in general as well as foster inter-sectoral linkages in Mozambique.

## **RESOURCE PLUNDER**

On the global market, the demand for fish and fish-products has been steadily growing. FAO (2006) estimated that IUU – caught fish and fish products entering global trade to be between US\$4-14 billion a year, and DFID sponsored research study put it at US\$9 billion while the EC settled for between US\$4.3 – 14.4 annually. In the case of Mozambique, for instance, the shrimp output rose from 9,000 to 9,300 metric tonnes between 2005 and 2006 and the corresponding export of assorted fisheries<sup>6</sup> increased by 10%. This mirrors production and export potentials in the country, although there is growing concern over rapid depletion of fisheries resources, a development that requires a just trade regime between EU and both countries.

The exploitation of fisheries resources in Angola and Mozambique continues to be dominated by foreign interests, which also have strong influence in both bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations that define the fisheries agreement. The existing FAs are between two unequal partners both politically and economically, a development that allows the enlarged and industrialised EU region to continue dictating terms and conditions of exploiting the fisheries resources in Angolan and Mozambican waters. Indeed, the framework of “partnership in trade talks” (Kamidza, 2007) misleads negotiators of vulnerable and poverty-stricken LDCs into thinking that any negotiated trade regime with an industrialised region such as the EU guarantees sustainable industrial growth and development, export competitiveness and export diversification of such sectors as the fisheries. This explains why both countries are not significantly benefiting from fisheries resources. Indeed, the continued unjust fisheries trading system between Angola and Mozambique on the one hand and the EU on the other is sweet music to the ears of EU fishing vessels.

Indirectly, the sector has been exposed to IUU activities, which are increasingly becoming a global issue with many harmful environmental, economic and social

impacts. This phenomenon is really a challenge of both coastal and port-states, which in many instances, have failed to benefit from many global trade relationships and other globally sponsored socio-economic programme and policies such as the structural adjustment package. The adoption of economic reforms in Mozambique, for instance, created and sustained de-industrialisation and de-agriculturalisation; and poor socio-economic conditions and poverty conditions among the citizens. At the same time, all the assumed developmental benefits due from the FAs have remained a 'dream' unlikely to be transformed into reality, at least in the short- to medium-term.

The continued exploitative tendencies reflect existing weak institutional capacities of both countries and lack of commitment to strengthen fisheries governance at the national, regional and global levels. In addition, there is insufficient support from internationally recognised legal instruments while policing measures on this sector are generally weak. This call for regional coastal member-states to urgently enact measures that compel fishing vessels to primarily support improved medium- to long-term goals aimed at sustainable fisheries growth and development and enhanced fisheries governance. FAO (2006) notes that IUU activities remain a serious impediment to sustainability in the fisheries sector, and that the global rise in fish prices not only provides a strong incentive for them (striving IUU activities), but also increasingly become lucrative line of business. This is the reason why the EU's fishing vessels' activities in fish waters of Angola and Mozambique are linked to fishing harvest malpractices and deliberate infringement of FAs provisions and other multilateral legal instruments that are designed to promote sustainable growth and development of this sector.

Therefore to curb this EU-led offensive on the waters of both Angola and Mozambique that has also attracted similar behaviour from other global vessels fish-looters such as those from Russia, Ukraine, Japan and Lithuania, requires political will and commitment to underpin measures that inhibit, prevent or even cut financial flows to IUU fishers, the main incentive that propels them to engage in their fishing activities. In order therefore to assist these vulnerable, poor and weak economies from "cursing their natural fisheries resource", it is imperative for other multilateral institutions such as the International Marine Organisation (IMO) to develop rigorous instruments and measures that empower port-state authorities to inspect with-

out fear, the merchant vessels including all their documentation. Such global organisations should also step-up vessel monitoring systems and ensure that countries comply with every international instrument aimed at monitoring IUU activities in the fish waters not only of Angola and Mozambique, but also of many other poor and vulnerable Southern African coastal and port countries, all of which have existing fisheries agreements with the EU.

Currently, trade relationship between Angola and Mozambique on the one hand and the EU on the other, suffer from ineffective fisheries instruments to control landings, transhipments, processing and use of ports despite the major impact the above have on trade in fish and fish products between the two parties. Indeed, this is really a nightmare for Angola and Mozambique. FAO (2006) estimates IUU activities in Angola and Mozambique resulted in losses of about US\$50 and US\$40 million respectively. In the SADC region, IUU fishing issues are summarised in Box V below.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that most IUU fishing vessels use “ports of convenience” which allow their fishers to dock at “friendly ports” with the view to either load or off-load fish and fish products without the knowledge of the vulnerable coastal and port-states of Angola and Mozambique. It is imperative to lobby strongly against the use of “ports of convenience” by IUU fishers. In some instances, IUU fishers are now using multi-cargo carrier vessels, which are extremely difficult to inspect at the port site without the provision of adequate international instrument guidelines on how to carry out such security-related inspection. This applies in particular to fish transhipped at sea prior to the vessel’s entry into port, a real challenge not only to Angola and Mozambique, but also to most coastal port-states in Africa.

**Box V: Some of the main illegal fishing practices in Southern Africa**

Bycatch and discard: this happens when fishermen catch fish other than the ones they are looking for, which are then thrown back into the sea. For example, up to 90% of prawns fisheries, are more often thrown back into the water. In some cases, bycatch is caused by lack of storage space and market factors such as the requirement to carry more ice for health standards;

Conflict between artisanal and industrial fleets: in some territorial waters, commercial or industrial fleet fishing interferes with artisanal or small-scale fishers. This happens in protected or restricted zones established near the shoreline, normally less than 3 nautical miles off the coastline;

Fishing by non-party vessels: more often, fishing is conducted by vessels that are not party to the agreement, which fail to comply with management measures of the agreement;

Fishing carried out by non-licensed vessels (poaching): this is a severe problem targeting fish stocks such as highly migratory species. This prevails due to lack of surveillance and enforcement capacity; corruption; and inexperienced and untried court system;

Lack of information and transparency in fishery agreements: this exists in relation to Distant Water Fishing Nations complying with agreed management measures and reporting regimes under fishery agreements and associated protocols. More often, foreign flagged vessels or their flag State do not provide the information that they have agreed to, under a fishery agreement thereby leaving the licensing State unable to assess if fishing is taking place in a legal or illegal manner;

Misreporting of catches: a segment of the fishing industry or fleet manipulates the catch reports and weights in order to be able to exceed the quota limits or misreport species caught. This takes advantage of limited enforcement capacity and investigation skills. Fish are then transhipped at sea to cargo vessels and only land at the correct port of origin. In this way, the fish catch assumes legal status;

Ports of convenience: also known as “ports of non-compliance”, which serve as the main distribution centre for fish caught off the African coastline. They provide services to IUU fleets and host a number of companies that operate pirate vessels. One such example is the Las Palmas de Gran Canary Port.

## **CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

The scope and complexity of these negotiations have placed significant additional strain on an already thinly spread negotiating institutional structures, policy and reach capacities, which are also involved in other bilateral and multilateral trade and cooperation negotiations. Both countries have limited capacity, hence they struggle to compile accurate and reliable fisheries production and trade statistics, providing information on the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the fisheries agreement. This development, unfortunately entrenches sub-optimal trade agreements with potentially disastrous consequences for the sector in particular, and the poor economy in general.

The FAs are patently biased towards the commercial and social interests of the EU. The EU fisheries policy reflects the interests of very few EU member states which have a huge dependency on exploiting cheap African resources. In this respect, it emerges that these FAs are mainly benefiting three countries – Spain, Portugal and France, a development that should encourage both countries to also seriously consider exploring new markets in addition to lobbying against the activities of those exploiters within the EU framework and beyond. It is therefore imperative that both countries should simply not renew the FAs, but also discount their consequential impacts and implications. In fact it appears that the EU is in great need of Angolan and Mozambican fisheries resources, a development that provides both countries with an opportunity of exploring new markets using the FAs as leverage in terms of demanding “real compensation” that adequately facilitate the development of the sector as well as other auxiliary sectoral linkages in the economies of both countries. Both countries can also seize this opportunity to demand “adherence” to agreements’ provisions and internationally supervised monitoring systems, with the possibility to revoke the FAs whenever non-compliance emerges. Already, after realising that the EU is not a significant market, Angola opted not to initial the EPAs despite the fact that all other group<sup>8</sup> member-states had done so. The country has withstood

more than six months of psychological pressure from the EU, and there are no movements towards an Interim EPA between the two parties. This development should act as a moral or psychological booster to both Angola and Mozambique in terms of either revoking existing FAs or when renegotiating future FAs.

The negotiators should coordinate and network strategic partners and demystify the notion that new trade and cooperation agreements provide space to be seriously respected by the EU. The negotiators should remember that the landscape in bilateral trade relations with the EU has drastically shifted from that of “historical sympathy” to that which is “driven by global aggressive business mindset”. This suggests that both countries should seriously consider assessing and evaluating existing FAs before considering re-negotiating the new trade regime. In this respect, it is imperative for both countries to ensure that no clauses related to the FAs or any future arrangements should be included in the EPAs. Failure to do so will lead to phenomena where such strategic resources as the fisheries are given away, in spite of the “significant comparative advantage” these countries might have over the EU. Both countries hardly import any fish-related products from the EU. This should empower negotiators of these countries to resist the interest of Europe. Indeed, countries should increasingly worry about the EU interests in access to fishing waters while they have little ability to patrol their waters, a development that “is a real risk and threat of over-fishing”. This gives rise to the following questions: why both countries spend human and financial resources negotiating how the EU should over-exploit (plunder) their fisheries resources? Is there an urgent need for both countries to continue negotiating fisheries with Europe amid growing underdevelopment, hunger and malnutrition in communities that are in close proximity to the hunting ground of the EU vessels? How should the fisheries agreements provide an enabling environment for genuine and unfettered trade in fisheries? It is true that Angolan and Mozambican FAs have failed to benefit the respective economies in ways that transform existing socio-economic conditions of the countries. At present, all the fundamentals of any sectoral-related trade agreements such as job creation, improved living conditions and better nutrition are not impressive. In fact, the fisheries resource is increasingly becoming a “curse” to respective nations. Imagine a country whose specific sector has been supervised by a series of negotiated trade agreements (since the 1980s), but has no significant trends in job creation, foreign currency earnings, contribution to GDP and minimal linkages with other sectors of the economy.

Due to the growing international production and demand for fish and fish products and the concern over depletion of fisheries resources, it is crucial for Angola and Mozambique to develop appropriate policies on fisheries trade that will culminate in the proper management of fisheries resources as they engage the EU, now under EPAs and in future trade talks. While the agreement spells out the framework for joint venture arrangements between local economic agents and their counterparts in Europe, stakeholders in both countries should guard against the possibilities of some “local fishing companies” being used as a front for EU operators to covertly access member-states’ fishing grounds. Such ventures, unfortunately, lack the developmental thrust that is necessary to support the countries’ socio-economic developmental goals.

It is imperative for both countries to develop tougher legislative instruments and measures in order to deal effectively with illegal operators and their shore-based agents. *Firstly*, this should provide scope and framework for activism and advocacy with the view to blacklist all known IUU vessels plying Angola and Mozambique waters as well as other vulnerable regional coastal and port-states such as Tanzania, Madagascar and Seychelles. *Secondly*, such lobbying should influence port-states to take specific actions including denying these vessels access to other waters or allowing them to enter their ports with the view to carrying out a thorough inspection of the cargo. *Thirdly*, in order to support such high-risk lobbying, Angola and Mozambique, jointly and individually, should encourage international organisations to establish authorised vessel lists with the view to sharing information with other strategic partners such as civil society groups, fisher-folk, export associations, citizens and donors. This exposes those vessels excluded from the list thereby making it easier to monitor their activities as well as lobby against their agenda globally. *Fourthly*, both countries should lobby for the introduction of specific measures on transshipments or if need be, propose a ban on all sea transshipments. *Fifthly*, Angola and Mozambique should lobby for measures that designate ports; require notification and time limits for such notification; allow inspections in ports; give more powers and responsibilities to inspectors; and enforce action in case there is evidence of IUU malpractices. *Lastly*, it is imperative to empower port-states to inspect documents, fishing gear and catch on board the fishing vessels when such vessels are voluntarily in its ports or its offshore terminals.



The reports of IUU activities that are linked directly or indirectly to the EU vessels indicate a lack of proper consultation and deep involvement of constituencies during the negotiations as well as the implementation of the agreement. In both countries, the engagement structures are relatively weak, and in some instances, the participation of critical civil society groups is viewed with suspicion. Indeed, democratic space remains largely limited for active participation of other stakeholders to engage with negotiators, who in some instances, are accused of tolerating corrupt practices of foreign fishing vessels. This also reflects weak institutional structures for engagement and lobbying the negotiations processes as well as limited research and analytical capacity to report on existing agreement outcomes in ways that support the sector's long-term vision and developmental agenda. The above therefore calls for the authorities in both countries to open up the space for engagement, harness critical thinking and implement actionable research with the view to informing negotiators in their interaction with their EU counterparts. Indeed, both countries since the operationalisation of the FAs have not created conditions for robust analysis and assessment of agreements' provisions as well as emerging outcomes, fears and threats to the sector in particular and the economy in general. This development reflects limited stakeholder cohesion, synergy building and capacity to shape the future of the sector in ways that inform subsequent fisheries negotiations either with the EU or with other foreign players. Indeed, such weakness is not helping the countries in many trade and cooperation negotiations related to the fisheries sector. It is therefore imperative for both countries to institute a proper coordination strategy on future fisheries trade negotiations as well as on other socio-economic justice agendas.

Both countries are not reflecting well organised structures in the communities, which should assist in the exploitation of this resource in spite of the fact that there are concerns of rising poverty and malnutrition. Therefore, it is imperative for both state and non-state structures to ensure that the communities have access to fish either for consumption or marketing purposes. This is outside of the scope and parameters of the FAs, and subsequently outside the EU mandate. These countries have poor physical infrastructure and underdeveloped fisheries trading networks, which limit the value of the production-marketing chain and deny the citizens, especially those in the hinterland access to this resource. All this makes the fisheries sector a true candidate for "cursed resource" whose exploitation is marginally benefiting the communities, citizens and the country while boosting the profits margins of the EU fishing ves-

sels. This shows that FAs have put profits (EU vessels) before poverty, malnutrition and socio-economic underdevelopment in both countries.

It is this concern that compels the EU-funded SADC Monitoring, Control and Surveillance programme (SADC-MCS) to improve management of regional marine fisheries resources, but most importantly in Angola and Mozambique, which are more vulnerable as they have recently emerged from protracted civil conflict. Therefore proper management of the resources is necessary to support post-conflict programmes on socio-economic development such as the full re-integration of all the internally displaced persons into communities; the provision of social services including schools, healthcare facilities and sanitation; improving widespread but entrenched poverty; improving life expectancy levels. Through this financial support, both countries can manage to establish and maintain basic national institutional capacity for efficient, sustainable and financially effective MCS as well as mechanisms for effective regional cooperation.

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## ENDNOTES

- 1 Mauritius, Madagascar and Seychelles
- 2 The FAs in both countries were first signed in the 1980s.
- 3 The last FA was signed in 2004 with provision for renewal every two years.
- 4 Non-state actors include the private sector, civil society organisations, faith-based organisations, non-governmental organisations, social movements and media
- 5 Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania.
- 6 See Art.1 of the Protocol.
- 7 Fish: fresh, chilled or frozen, dried, salted or smoked, canned and crustaceans.
- 8 Angola was negotiating the EPAs together with Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, South Africa and Tanzania. Tanzania signed Interim EPAs as part of the East African Community, and all except South Africa signed as part of the SADC configuration. South Africa reverted to the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement.

